Authorities (NCAs) to enforce this legislation. Similarly, the EU Commission has also promoted the EU competition model among its neighbours within the European Neighbouring Policy (ENP). 5 The fact that new EU Member States and candidate countries adopted national competition laws which mirrored the EU substantive provisions does not prevent the NCAs of these countries from having different enforcement priorities from the EU Commission. In particular, Wahl has noted that, following the decentralisation of competition law enforcement, a number of NCAs in the new EU Member States and candidate countries would be "more eager" than the EU Commission to sanction exploitative conducts. 6 Due to the long history of price regulation, in fact, the general public in these countries often perceives competition rules as a mechanism to restrain the excessive profi ts of dominant companies. 7 Furthermore, the prosecution of excessive pricing might also serve the publicity objectives of the newly established NCAs. The latter often do not have the resources or the experience to investigate and collect evidence against complex competition infringements, such as cartels or exclusionary abuses. Sanctioning the excessive pricing may thus represent an "enforcement shortcut", which allows the NCA to show concrete enforcement results in its annual report. 8 Finally, the deficiencies of the regulatory frameworks in the liberalised network industries (eg energy, telecoms and other utilities) might have led to the increasing interventions of the NCAs in these sectors. 9 The hypothesis that the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries might be more "eager" than the EU Commission to sanction excessive 5 For an overview of the basic features of the ENP and in relation to the soft law approach followed by the EU Commission in designing the ENP see M Cremona, "The European Neighbourhood Policy as a Framework for Modernization" in F Maiani, R Petrov and E Mouliarova (eds) pricing under the corresponding national provisions of Article 102 TFEU has never been proved by any empirical evidence. The current paper aims at fi lling this gap by analysing the degree of enforcement against excessive prices by the NCAs and the courts of a selected number of jurisdictions. In particular, new EU Member States (Bulgaria and Romania), candidate countries (Croatia, 10 Macedonia, 11 Montenegro and Serbia 12 ), potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and countries included into the ENP (Moldova, 13 Ukraine) were included in this study. For the purposes of this empirical analysis, we have selected 38 NCA decisions concerning investigations of excessive or unfair pricing adopted during the last 10 years in the selected jurisdictions.
14 It should be noted that the list of the selected decisions is not exhaustive. Nevertheless, these decisions illustrate the patterns of enforcement against excessive prices in the target countries. Instead of reviewing the enforcement patterns in each of the selected jurisdictions, we have conducted a cross-country analysis, focusing on the following fi ve issues: (i) economic sectors where excessive pricing has been sanctioned by the NCAs; (ii) substantive tests applied by the NCAs to determine that particular prices were excessive; (iii) remedies applied by the NCAs; (iv) the presence and role of judicial review; and (v) the presence and role of a National Regulatory Authority (NRA). The Annex at the end of this paper provides a systematic overview of the decisions analysed in the present work.
The cross-country comparison aims at verifying the hypothesis that the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries have been more eager than the EU Commission to sanction excessive pricing. In particular, the paper aims to demonstrate that this is a common trend, which characterises 10 Croatia is an acceding country. The EU and Croatia signed Croatia's EU Accession Treaty on 9 December 2011. Subject to ratifi cation of the Treaty by all the Member States and Croatia, Croatia will become the EU's 28th the selected jurisdictions independently of their "EU status" (ie Member States, candidates, neighbours). In particular, the paper aims at identifying common enforcement trends in relation to the fi ve issues mentioned above. In order to place this comparative study in the EU context, the paper starts with a historical overview of the objectives that the EU founding fathers had in mind when drafting Article 102 TFEU. Secondly, it provides an overview of the diverging methodology developed in economic scholarship and competition enforcement practice for determining when the price should be considered excessive. Finally, the paper conducts a cross-country comparison of the most relevant decisions adopted by the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions sanctioning excessive pricing.
B. EXCESSIVE PRICES IN EU COMPETITION LAW

The Initial Focus on the Exploitative Abuses
The expression "abuse of dominance" is usually considered a synonym of the anti-competitive practices that a dominant company employs in order to preserve and/or strengthen its dominance. 15 Article 102 TFEU contains a list of abusive practices, which has been continuously expanded by the CJEU. 16 Although the CJEU has recognised that the list of abuses mentioned in Article 102 TFEU is not exhaustive, 17 one should note that these abuses have mainly an exploitative rather than an exclusionary character. In particular, this provision of the Treaty sanctions the dominant undertakings which either impose "unfair" sale or purchase prices or "unfair" contractual conditions, 18 limit the production or technological development "to the prejudice of the fi nal consumers", 19 or oblige the purchaser to accept "supplementary obligations" not related to the object of the contract. 20 These types of abuse appear distant from the modern notion of exclusionary abuse of dominance, as they refer to the harm to customers of the dominant fi rm, rather than to its competitors. The concept of "unfair price" mentioned in Article 102(a) TFEU may refer both to prices which are "too low" (ie exclusionary predatory prices) and to prices which are "too high" to be fair (ie exploitative excessive prices). However, the European Commission has concentrated its enforcement actions only on the second type of "unfair prices".
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The analysis of travaux préparatoires of the Treaty of Rome has recently prompted some authors to conclude that its drafters were convinced that Article 102 TFEU should sanction primarily exploitative abuses which directly hamper the consumer welfare. 22 The emphasis on exploitative abuses in Article 102 TFEU could be explained by the fact that in the 1950s most of the prices for basic commodities in Western Europe were still regulated by the state. 23 The wording of Article 102 TFEU was also infl uenced by the price control introduced in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, which granted the ECSC Commission the power to directly regulate prices in the coal and steel markets, when they were considered to be excessive. 24 Since the EU Commission did not adopt any decision under Article 102 TFEU during the immediate years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the meaning of the provision remained "obscure" and initially led some authors to argue that Article 102 TFEU was aimed exclusively at sanctioning exploitative conducts which could harm fi nal consumers. 25 The turning point in the interpretation of the objectives of Article 102 TFEU took place when the CJEU in Continental Can recognised that Article 102 TFEU could sanction exclusionary abuses of dominance as well. 26 In particular, in Continental Can, the CJEU clarifi ed that Article 102 TFEU had to be interpreted with a view of the overriding purpose of safeguarding a system of "undistorted competition" within the common market. 27 Exclusionary practices thus fell within the scope of the application of Article 102 TFEU: by excluding its competitors, the dominant company "partitioned" the EU common market. The CJEU's line of reasoning expressed in Continental Can has infl uenced the enforcement of 21 Supra n 2. 22 Article 102 TFEU in the subsequent decades. In particular, even in its recent case law, the CJEU still recognises that the main goal of Article 102 TFEU is to safeguard the system of "undistorted competition" within the EU common market. 28 2. When is the Price "Excessive"?
As Section B.3 will demonstrate, the case law related to excessive pricing is quite limited. The debate on this issue has thus taken place at a rather "theoretical" level. In particular, economists have developed a number of tests that the NCAs should apply to verify when a price can be considered "excessive".
Most of the economists share a sceptical view vis-à-vis the ability of the competition authority to effectively detect and sanction excessive pricing under Article 102 TFEU. Such a sceptical approach is due to two main concerns: 29 fi rst, the market might self-correct in the long term; secondly, sanctioning excessive pricing may negatively affect dynamic effi ciencies. In a competitive market excessive prices normally last for only a limited period of time; in the long term, the high profi ts enjoyed by the dominant company will attract new entrants. 30 Consequently, excessive pricing causes a self-adjustment of the market in the long term, and thus any intervention by the NCAs against excessive pricing runs the risk of false negative errors. 31 According to Evans and Padilla, "consumers are best served with a policy that leaves fi rms, including dominant fi rms, free to charge prices above cost and earn positive and possibly high profi ts". 32 This assumption has been challenged by Ezrachi and Gilo, who argued that high prices imposed by the incumbent are not reason enough per se to encourage a new entrant to compete with the incumbent. 33 According to the authors, a new entrant will primarily compare its marginal costs of production with those of the incumbent; only when its marginal costs are lower than those faced by the incumbent will the third party enter into the market. 34 Despite the divergences concerning the likehood that high prices 28 In 2007, the CJEU referred in British Airways to its previous judgment in Continental Can and ruled that "Article 82 EC (now Art 102 TFEU) is aimed not only at practices which may cause prejudice to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure": Case may attract new entrants, consensus exists on the fact that the NCA should sanction excessive prices when the relevant market is characterised by non-transitory entry barriers, which would impede new entries even in the long term (ie regulatory barriers which restrict the number of players in the markets).
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The second concern related to NCAs' ability to sanction excessive pricing pertains to the possible negative effects of the NCA's intervention on dynamic effi ciencies. In particular, by sanctioning excessive prices, the NCA might undermine the incentives of the dominant company to invest in new products and technologies. 36 This argument is nicely summarised in a well-known paragraph from the Trinko judgment: 37 "Mere acquisition of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts 'business acumen' in the fi rst place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth."
Taking into consideration the two concerns mentioned above, economists have elaborated different tests to assess when the NCA should intervene to sanction excessive pricing. According to Evans and Padilla, the NCA should intervene when three cumulative conditions are satisfi ed: (i) the company enjoys a monopoly or "super dominance" in the relevant market; 38 (ii) prices are above the average total costs; and (iii) excessive pricing hinders the introduction of a new product into the market. Motta and De Streel proposed a similar threefold test, focused on the existence of a super dominance and structural barriers which make entry unlikely. 39 However, instead of referring to the introduction of a new product, the authors proposed the absence of an NRA as a third condition. 40 According to the authors, NCAs should not sanction excessive pricing in regulated markets, 35 where tariffs are supervised and regulated by an NRA, since this would create a competence overlap between the NCA and the NRA.
To sum up, economists generally recognise that NCAs should only sanction excessive pricing under Article 102 TFEU in exceptional circumstances. However, there is no clear consensus in relation to the "test" that should be applied to decide in concrete cases whether the NCA's intervention against excessive prices is needed. As we shall see in the next section, the lack of consensus in the economic literature on how to approach excessive pricing is also refl ected on the diverging approaches adopted by the CJEU, the EU Commission and the NCAs on this issue.
What is the Appropriate Standard of Review for Excessive Pricing: Lessons from the EU and Beyond
The CJEU recognised the possibility of sanctioning excessive pricing under Article 102 TFEU for the fi rst time in General Motors. 41 In that judgment, however, the Luxembourg Court did not clarify when the price imposed by a dominant undertaking should be considered excessive. The CJEU simply ruled that "an undertaking in a dominant position may abuse it by imposing a price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided". 42 In United Brands, the CJEU introduced a twofold test to verify when a price was excessive in comparison to the economic value of the product. 43 In particular, the EU Commission was required by the Court to analyse the cost structure and then to compare the production costs with the price imposed in order to verify whether the profi t margin of the dominant company was excessive. 44 Over the years, the CJEU has reiterated the United Brands test in a number of preliminary rulings requested by the national courts. 45 However, as argued by Judge Wahl, these judgments often had a "declaratory nature": the CJEU restated the United Brands test, but it left the duty to apply the test to the facts of the case to the national referring court. 46 As recognised by the Court in United Brands, in fact, the analysis of the production costs may be extremely complex, particularly in relation to the estimation and allocation of fi xed costs. 47 Additionally, besides being diffi cult to apply, the cost-profi t test would require the 41 46 Wahl, supra n 6, 54. 47 The analysis of some exclusionary practices also requires an analysis of the fi xed and marginal production costs of the dominant company (ie predatory pricing and rebates). However, in the EU Commission to assess the degree of profi tability of the incumbent, an assessment which would be equivalent to a form of price regulation. 48 Finally, the cost-profi t test did not take into consideration the demand fl uctuations. As noted by the European Commission in Scandlines, "customers are notably willing to pay more for something specifi c attached to the product/service that they consider valuable". 49 Most of the EU Member States and candidate countries have transposed the text of Article 102 TFEU into their domestic competition rules. Consequently, the problem of defi nition of the applicable substantive standard for excessive pricing is common to all of these jurisdictions. Two well-known cases are worth mentioning, since they represent illustrative examples of the possible approaches adopted by the national courts and the NCAs in order to assess excessive pricing.
The fi rst example is the Napp case, in which the UK Offi ce for Fair Trade (OFT) sanctioned the pharmaceutical company Napps. 50 The case involved aspects of both predatory and excessive pricing. Napp, in fact, sold its morphine products to doctors at excessive prices in order to recover the losses generated in supplying drugs to the British hospitals, which assigned contracts on the basis of a competitive tender. 51 In relation to the analysis of excessive prices, the OFT developed a twofold test. Specifi cally, the OFT would sanction excessive pricing when: (i) the prices were "higher than what would be expected in a competitive market"; and (ii) there was no "effective competitive pressure to bring them down to competitive levels". 52 While the CJEU in United Brands required the EU Commission to compare only costs and prices, the OFT compared a plurality of elements, including Napp's costs and prices vis-à-vis the costs and prices of its most profi table competitor. Furthermore, the OFT compared the prices applied by Napp in the domestic and export markets. 53 While the OFT's decision in Napp was upheld by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, the judgment of the South African Competition Tribunal contest of exclusionary practices, the cost-price analysis is ancillary to the assessment of exclusionary behavior of the dominant company in the market. 48 This was the argument put forward by the Court (SACT) in Mittal Steel was subsequently annulled by the South African Competition Appeal Court (SACAC). The interesting aspect of the case is that, even though Section 8 of the South African competition law was directly inspired by Article 102 TFEU, SACT rejected the cost-profi t test developed by the CJEU in United Brands. 54 SACT, in fact, developed an alternative "structural" approach: Mittal Steel enjoyed a super dominance in the relevant market and there was no likely entry in the future due to structural barriers; consequently, it was likely that the prices applied by Mittal Steel were excessive.
55 SACT thus elaborated a test which "presumed" that Mittal Steel would engage in excessive pricing due to its market share and the characteristics of the relevant market. On appeal, SACAC rejected this approach, claiming that excessive pricing could be sanctioned only after a cost-profi ts analysis. 56 The diverging views between SACAC and SACT show that different courts within the same jurisdiction might have different views on how excessive pricing should be analysed.
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The preceding discussion demonstrates that neither the economists nor the competition law enforcers have managed to develop a uniform and straightforward test to analyse excessive pricing under Article 102 TFEU. In the absence of a clear substantive test, and in the view of the limited case law of the CJEU and the EU Commission, the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries have been left with little guidance in the complex process of developing their own standards to assess the exploitative conducts of the dominant companies. The ensuing section provides a comparative narrative of their experiences in this domain.
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES OF EXCESSIVE PRICES IN SELECTED NEW EU MEMBER STATES AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES
Economic Sectors
As with any other form of anti-competitive unilateral practice, excessive pricing can be employed by the companies with an uncontested dominant position where such conduct could be viewed as exclusionary or exploitative. It would then be reasonable to assume that excessive prices will be spotted primarily in the highly concentrated or monopolistic economic sectors such as network industries and utilities, where the ownership of infrastructure or exclusive rights granted by the national or local authorities create uncontested dominance on the relevant market. A comparative analysis of the selected cases confi rms this hypothesis. For example, in the electricity markets, where the consumption tariffs are typically approved and monitored by the NRAs, the dominant companies were prosecuted by the NCAs for imposing additional charges, such as reconnection fees, 58 fees for issuing monthly invoices 59 and additional charges for the installation of the ancillary equipment. 60 In the telecommunications markets, the NCAs have investigated excessive prices used as a part of margin squeeze strategy, 61 or as additional charges that should have been covered by the regulated tariffs. 62 In the postal sector, the investigations targeted excessive prices applied in the provision of postal services 63 and sales of postage stamps. 64 Excessive pricing strategies have been also spotted in those economic sectors where there was no state regulation of prices, but where the dominant undertakings were taking advantage of their ownership of essential facilities. In particular, the largest number of the infringement decisions concerned bus terminal services and funeral services linked to the management of cemeteries. In Bulgaria, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia the bus terminal operators were imposing additional unjustifi ed charges on the bus operators and passengers for ticketing and other ancillary services. 65 In the case of funeral services in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro, the undertakings entrusted with the management of the municipal cemeteries were applying excessive prices for the access and usage of cemetery grounds and premises in order to discourage customers from using the optional funeral services offered by competitors or in order to raise the rivals' costs and put them at a competitive disadvantage. 66 In addition, the ownership of the essential facilities or exclusive rights which guaranteed the monopolistic position of the dominant undertaking led to the prosecution of the excessive pricing in sectors such as water supply (Bulgaria), 67 airport catering (Croatia), 68 quality certifi cation (Croatia), 69 The review of the economic sectors where the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions have prosecuted dominant companies for excessive pricing allows for identifying certain tendencies. In almost all the target countries excessive prices have been found in the network industries (telecoms, mobile telephony, postal services) and utilities sectors (water, electricity), which are often subject to price controls exercised by the NRAs. This fi nding is not surprising, particularly in the view of the structural and regulatory barriers which characterise these economic sectors. The NCAs' interventions can also be explained by the social signifi cance of those sectors, taking into account that excessive prices as an exploitative abuse have affected a large number of consumers. On the other hand, an interesting fi nding of the present case study is that the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions have also intervened outside of network industries, in sectors which should normally be subject to free competition. In particular, the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries have sanctioned the excessive pricing imposed by companies which acquired a monopolistic position due to an exclusive right granted by the state (ie transports, funeral services). To summarise the observed trends of intervention in the identifi ed economic sectors, we submit that the NCAs have found excessive prices predominantly in markets with high entry barriers and low or even non-existent competition. The market barriers could have been created artifi cially as a result of state regulation and exclusive rights granted to the dominant undertakings (eg funeral services, utilities). They could also be caused by economic reasons, such as the importance of infrastructure in network industries (eg telecoms, electricity) or particular features of small economies where only a single provider of goods or services could viably operate in a particular market (eg bus terminal services).
Substantive Test
When it comes to determining whether a particular pricing strategy should be considered excessive or unfair, and can thus be prosecuted as an abuse of dominant position, the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions are left with little guidance from the EU. The United Brands test highlighted the importance of cost-profi ts analysis, which to a certain degree has been accepted in virtually all of the selected jurisdictions. Sometimes with direct reference to the United Brands precedent, 74 the NCAs have engaged in the assessment of the cost structures 70 Annex I, Case ME1. 71 Annex I, Case ME4. 72 Annex I, Case UA5. 73 Annex I, Cases UA4, UA7. 74 Annex I, Case BG5.
of the dominant undertakings and investigated the relationship of the allegedly excessive prices to the identifi ed costs. 75 For example, the Bulgarian NCA employed linear price analysis in order to identify a potential margin squeeze strategy in the telecoms sector. In particular, the Bulgarian NCA compared the wholesale access price against the retail price for voice services for a set of calls varying in duration 76 and established that the difference between the retail price and the wholesale price is often non-existent or negative. 77 Similarly, the Croatian NCA rejected an abuse of dominance complaint when it established that a price increase in cement certifi cation services was justifi ed by the increased scope of testing activities mandated by the EU legislation. 78 In Moldova, the NCA analysed the cost structure of a bus terminal operator in order to verify the justifi cation of the advance sale fee added to the price of the ticket. This cost analysis allowed the NCA to conclude that such a fee was not based on any additional costs when compared to the ticket sales on the date of departure. As a result, the advance sale fee was labelled as abusive and the dominant undertaking was ordered to cease its application.
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In Albania, the NCA compared the profi t margins of a dominant mobile phone operator with those present in competitive markets as part of its costprofi t analysis. 80 Comparison with the prices and profi t margins realised in the competitive markets has been routinely employed by the Ukrainian NCA, and has led to the prosecution of excessive prices for products ranging from bread 81 to liquefi ed petroleum gas. 82 All of the above examples demonstrate that the relationship between the price and the actual costs incurred by the dominant company has played an important role in determining excessive pricing.
It should be noted, however, that the cost-profi t analysis was not always as structured and precise as suggested in the economic literature. In a number of cases, the price-setting mechanism employed by the dominant undertakings did not have any relationship to their cost structures. This fi nding alone was suffi cient for the NCAs to label the applied prices as unfair or excessive. For example, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the NCA that the prices for the bus terminal services should not be based on the income of the customers (bus operators), which would amount to unfair and discriminatory pricing. 83 Another category of cases where the NCAs established the 75 Annex I, Cases BG1, BG4, BG10, HR1, HR2, MD1, MD2, RO1, ME1, AL1, ME2, ME3. 76 The Bulgarian NCA analysed the prices of four sets of call: (i) intra-city calls terminated during the peak time zone; (ii) intra-city during off-peak; (iii) inter-city during peak; and (iv) inter-city during off-peak. 77 Annex I, Case BG6. 78 Annex I, Case HR2. 79 Annex I, Cases MD1, MD2. 80 Annex I, Case AL1. 81 Annex I, Case UA6. 82 Annex I, Case UA2. 83 Annex I, Case BG7. existence of unfair prices concerned those cases where a pricing mechanism was partially used for exclusionary purposes, ie in order to raise the competitors' costs and force them out of the market. In a Croatian case, an airport handling company was found to be in violation of the national equivalent of Article 102 TFEU when it imposed higher handling charges on the airlines using the competitors' storage facilities. 84 The Montenegrin NCA, on at least two occasions, held that a price increase applied to customers who were purchasing optional funeral services from competitors did not have any relationship to the actual costs and was therefore unfair or excessive. 85 Although not as widespread as the United Brands test, the structural approach to determination of excessive prices articulated in Mittal Steel is also present in the enforcement practice of the selected NCAs. In Macedonia, the NCA has developed a line of cases where voicemail charges imposed on callers by the mobile phone operators were labelled as exploitation and unjust enrichment. This conclusion was reached by the NCA because the callers did not have a choice while the clients of the mobile operators had also been charged for the voicemail service as a part of their subscription package. 86 For the same reasons, the Macedonian NCA prosecuted telecoms and electricity incumbents for making their customers pay for the issuance and delivery of monthly bills. 87 The absence of economic justifi cation as a way of shifting the burden of proof onto the concerned undertakings has also been spotted in the selected jurisdictions. For instance, the Bulgarian NCA used this approach in challenging the unfair pricing of TV programmes 88 and bus terminal services. 89 The Ukrainian NCA saw no economic justifi cation for the higher prices charged for medicines sold in the city hospital than those marketed through the pharmacies. 90 Finally, the most straightforward way of prosecuting excessive pricing has been developed by the NCAs that were willing to intervene in the economic sectors under state price control exercised by the NRAs. In the most typical situations, the NCAs labelled as excessive the prices that exceeded regulated tariffs or additional charges that were already covered by the regulated tariffs. For example, the Bulgarian NCA reasoned its fi nding of excessive pricing in the markets for postage stamps 91 and water 92 by the fact that the applied prices exceeded the maximum tariffs set in the sector specifi c regulations. 84 Annex I, Case HR1. 85 Annex I, Cases ME2, ME3. 86 Annex I, Cases MK1, MK2. 87 Annex I, Cases MK3, MK4. 88 Annex I, Case BG3. 89 Annex I, Case BG7. 90 Annex I, Case UA5. 91 Annex I, Case BG8. 92 Annex I, Case BG9.
The Ukrainian NCA went against dominant companies applying prices that exceeded the regulated tariffs in the markets for building maintenance services, 93 electricity, 94 medical 95 and veterinary 96 certifi cations. The Montenegrin NCA went even further and prosecuted the dominant bus operator for charging higher ticket prices than were agreed upon in the transport services contract concluded with the local administration.
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The empirical study showed that the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions referred to different standards in their analysis of the excessive pricing. The cost-profi t analysis suggested by the CJEU in United Brands was not the only substantive test followed by these NCAs: consideration of welfare justice and the structural approach developed in Mittal Steel have also been applied as substantive tests. It can be stated that the observed enforcement practices in the selected jurisdictions demonstrated that eventually, in all cases where the excessive pricing was at issue, the NCAs have considered the economic justifi cation of the applied prices (ie their relationship to the cost structure of the dominant undertaking). The consideration of the economic justifi cation, however, differed signifi cantly from country to country, causing inconsistent enforcement which has hampered legal certainty. Although some consideration of the costs is present in all jurisdictions, the scope and complexity of the economic analysis required by the NCAs to support their fi ndings has varied. Moreover, the set of prima facie evidence that shifted the burden of proof (ie concerning the existence of economic justifi cation) onto the undertakings concerned also differed. This fact made it more diffi cult for the dominant undertakings to defend their pricing strategies in particular jurisdictions.
Remedies
When identifying the types of remedies selected by the NCAs as a tool for preventing and correcting excessive prices, one should keep in mind that the selected jurisdictions may differ with regard to the powers of the NCAs to impose remedies. For instance, unlike the new EU Member States, the candidate countries and potential candidates have only relatively recently entrusted their NCAs with direct sanctioning powers. One should also distinguish between the sanctioning powers of the NCAs (to impose monetary fi nes) 98 and their ability 93 Annex I, Case UA1. 94 Annex I, Case UA3. 95 Annex I, Case UA4. 96 Annex I, Case UA7. 97 Annex I, Case ME4. 98 While in the majority of the jurisdictions covered by the present research the NCAs are authorised to impose fi nes calculated as a percentage of the annual turnover of the undertaking(s) concerned, there are some notable exceptions. In Montenegro, under the law that was in force until 8 October 2012, the antitrust fi nes were expressed as multiples of "minimum wages" or as a percentage of illegal profi ts obtained as a result of the infringement. In Moldova, the NCA to affect the conduct of the undertakings concerned by imposing behavioural remedies or changing the structure of the relevant market by ordering the divestitures. 99 Finally, one should keep in mind that even the NCAs having identical sanctioning and remedying powers may display signifi cant divergence in the application of those powers, due to the inherent discretion in formulating their own enforcement priorities. 100 With the above caveats in mind, we shall proceed with the review of the remedies applied by the selected NCAs in the excessive pricing cases.
The most common combination of remedies observed was the imposition of fi nes in conjunction with an order to cease the application of the excessive prices.
101 However, sometimes the NCAs went further, and crafted certain behavioural remedies aimed at preventing such excessive pricing in the future. In the Zagreb airport catering services case, for instance, the Croatian NCA ordered the handling company to modify its prices so as to refl ect the actual costs and apply them in a transparent, objective and non-discriminatory manner. 102 The new prices had to be approved by the NCA. In Macedonia, the NCA has been more specifi c and fi xed the "reasonable" price levels in its infringement decision against an incumbent telecoms supplier. In order to prevent margin squeeze practices, the Macedonian NCA insisted that wholesale prices for lease of digital lines to third-party providers should be at least 30% lower than those on the retail level applied to the fi nal customers of the dominant operator.
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In Montenegro, the NCA has decided to engage in continuous monitoring of the dominant undertaking's conduct. The owner of a maritime petroleum depot was ordered to set cost-based prices and, for a period of two years, to notify the NCA about any new customers requesting the usage of storage capacities.
104 At times, the NCAs have also involved other state authorities in is not authorised to impose fi nes directly. This authority lies with the courts, which apply the rule's administrative procedure, which does not recognise the fi nes calculated as a percentage of the undertaking's turnover. 99 For example, the Montenegrin competition law specifi cally provides that in cases of abuse of dominant position the NCA is not authorised to impose structural measures such as divestitures, sales of assets or shares, termination of existing contracts on disposal of rights that allow to exercise decisive infl uence on the undertaking's conduct. In Serbia the Competition Act allows the NCA under certain circumstances to impose structural remedies in order to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of an infringement. This provision, however, remains to be further specifi ed in the government's regulation on the matter. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Competition Act authorises the NCA to impose "other appropriate measures, which contribute to competition between undertakings on the relevant market" without further specifying whether such measures could be also structural. Forced divestitures are authorised explicitly only in cases where prohibited concentration was implemented. 100 See, eg A Svetlicinii, "The Croatian Competition Authority Releases its Plan of Activities for 2010-2011", e-Competitions, no 31511, 25 February 2010, available at www.concurrences.com. 101 Annex I, Cases BG1, BG10, MK1, MK2, MK3, MK4, MK5, MD1, MD2, ME2, ME3. 102 Annex I, Case HR1. 103 Annex I, Case MK5. 104 Annex I, Case ME1. the monitoring of the imposed remedies. Thus, in a case concerning building maintenance services, the Ukrainian NCA ordered the dominant undertaking to fi t its service fees within the limits allowed by the legislation, and submit the modifi ed fees for approval by the local administration.
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As argued by Lyons, economists usually recognise that fi nes are ineffective as a remedy against excessive pricing.
106 In fact, private companies have a natural tendency to increase prices in order to maximise profi ts when they enjoy a monopoly position in the market. Consequently, a fi ne will not dissuade the dominant company from increasing prices. Similarly, the effectiveness of a behavioural remedy should also be questioned: by imposing a behavioural remedy, the NCA will de facto subject the incumbent to an additional form of regulation. In addition, the NCA will bind itself to a long-term monitoring task. The monitoring duty can be particularly cumbersome for a newly established NCA affected by limited human resources.
107 Structural remedies could be more effective in eliminating the structural barriers which restrict competition in the market. However, the NCAs of the selected jurisdictions have not imposed structural remedies to solve abuses of dominance related to excessive pricing in any of the analysed cases. This was due to the fact that these institutions either lacked the competence under their national competition laws to impose structural remedies or lacked the political strength necessary to impose a structural remedy.
Judicial Review
Judicial review of the decisions adopted by the NCA is present in the competition laws of all of the selected jurisdictions. The most common form of judicial review is carried out by the administrative court specialised in reviewing the decisions of the state authorities. 108 In some of the jurisdictions covered by this research, the review of the NCA's decisions is carried out by the regular courts,determination of the penalty for competition infringement. 110 The selected data are far from conclusive because the judicial precedents on excessive pricing have been identifi ed in only two jurisdictions out of total of ten: Bulgaria and Macedonia. The absence of court decisions in the other selected jurisdictions can be explained either by the fact that the relevant judgments have not been made publicly accessible or that the courts have not reviewed the excessive pricing decisions rendered by the NCAs.
In Bulgaria, the NCA's infringement decisions in the fi eld of excessive pricing have been the subject of intense judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC). In a number of cases, the SAC reviewed the substantive test applied by the NCA in determining the "excessiveness" of the prices imposed by the dominant companies. Although the court did not exhibit any preference for a particular substantive test, it verifi ed the consistency of its application and the evidentiary support provided by the NCA. Thus, the SAC upheld the NCA's decisions where the excessive prices were determined on the basis of a cost-profi t test, 111 the absence of economic justifi cation 112 and deviation from the tariffs set by the NRA. 113 At the same time, regardless of the test chosen by the NCA, the SAC quashed the infringement decisions where the economic analysis of the alleged excessive prices was lacking. 114 The SAC also considered the presence of the NRA as a factor that should restrain the NCA's intervention. In two cases concerning electricity and telecoms sectors, the SAC annulled the NCA's interventions in price regulation exercised by the respective NRAs.
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Macedonia represents a different example of judicial control, where the courts (the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court) have focused their review predominantly on the procedural aspects of the NCA's investigations and formal elements of the NCA's infringement decisions. A typical Macedonian scenario of judicial review is as follows: (i) the Administrative Court quashes the NCA's infringement decision for procedural irregularities (for example, the NCA fails to mention the exact duration of the infringement); (ii) the NCA remedies the procedural irregularities and adopts the repeated decision, which addresses the comments of the court; (iii) the Administrative Court rejects the appeal of the parties against the second decision where no procedural irregularities are found; and (iv) the Supreme Court upholds the judgment of the Administrative Court where no procedural irregularities are found. 116 As a result, the substantive test and economic analysis of the NCA remained outside the courts' attention. As already stated, the study has identifi ed the judicial control of the excessive pricing decisions only in two out of ten target jurisdictions. The Bulgarian and Macedonian jurisprudence represent two different examples of the role and infl uence of the judiciary on the development of the enforcement practice in the fi eld of excessive pricing. In Bulgaria, the NCA's decisions have been subject to substantive judicial review, which has tested the validity of the economic analysis and substantive standards applied by the NCA. The Bulgarian jurisprudence has also delineated the competences of the NCAs and NRAs in relation to the regulation of prices. The Macedonian experience provides a different picture. In this jurisdiction, the attention of the courts has primarily been focused on the procedural aspects of the NCA's investigations and the formal elements of the infringement decisions. As a result, the Macedonian NCA remained largely unrestrained in the formulation of its enforcement standards and continued its interventions into the regulated sectors, as the ensuing section demonstrates. These considerations suggest that the importance of the courts in shaping the enforcement practices and standards applied by the NCAs in the area of excessive prices should not be underestimated. The Bulgarian jurisprudence on this subject demonstrates that the judicial review can be an important factor in formulating the substantive test and ensuring the quality of the NCA's economic assessment, which is inherent in the application of the cost-based test.
Presence of the Sector Regulator
The above review of the economic sectors where the NCAs investigated the application of excessive pricing by the dominant undertaking demonstrated that almost half of the respective infringement decisions were adopted in relation to the sectors where sector-specifi c regulations were enforced by the NRAs. Sector regulation often included price regulation in the form of price formulae, maximum profi t margins, maximum level of tariffs or fi xed tariffs.
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The presence of the sector regulator has obviously not prevented the NCAs from intervening with the price-setting process of the dominant undertakings. It is beyond the narrow scope of the present research to examine the degree of state regulation in particular economic sectors and the functionality of the NRAs in the selected jurisdictions. Instead, our comparative study was focused exclusively on the approach adopted by the NCAs when prosecuting excessive prices. In this section we discuss the tendencies observed in the approach used by the NCAs in relation to the existence of sector-specifi c regulations, such as price control, exercised by the NRAs and their correlation with the enforcement of competition rules exercised by the NCAs.
In virtually all of the researched jurisdictions the enforcement of competition rules runs parallel to the regulatory powers exercised by NRAs in the recently liberalised network industries. The NCAs normally exercise signifi cant discretion in formulating their enforcement priorities, which leads to certain heterogeneity in the NCAs' approaches towards sector regulation. As a rule, the NCAs are not formally prohibited from intervening in sectors covered by sector regulations. However, the presence of the NRA has often affected the NCA's decision when conducting its analysis and imposing the remedy against excessive pricing.
In Bulgaria, the existence of sector regulation exercised by the NRA served as a ground for the annulment of the NCA's decisions in the electricity and telecommunications sectors. 118 In the water supply and postal services sectors, the Bulgarian NCA conducted its price assessment based on the tariffs set by the NRA. 119 The Ukrainian NCA acted in a similar manner when it established the existence of excessive prices in the building maintenance and electricity markets. 120 Finally, the Serbian NCA proved to be the most "sensitive" to sector regulation when it suspended its investigation into the alleged excessive pricing on the cable TV market due to the fact that the NRA had already acted by attributing to the dominant undertaking the SMP (signifi cant market power) status and established a price monitoring mechanism. 121 The Macedonian NCA followed the opposite approach and handed down its unfair pricing decisions in the telecoms and electricity sectors with little or no deference to the regulatory framework. 122 The Albanian NCA demonstrated more regard to the sector regulation and, in its decision establishing excessive prices in the mobile telephone market, it recommended that the NRA take immediate measures for the liberalisation of the relevant market. 123 In Bosnia & Herzegovina, the NCA demonstrated its deference to the NRA in a more indirect way by using procedural tools (expiration of the mandatory period for the adoption of the infringement decision) to avoid ruling on the alleged margin squeeze practices of the incumbent telecoms operators. 124 As argued by Nietsche and Wiethaus, the NCA should not sanction excessive pricing in the sectors where an NRA is present. 125 This suggestion aims at avoiding an overlap between the NCA's and NRA's enforcement activities. This study has shown that not all the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries have followed this recommendation, by often sanctioning excessive pricing in the regulated sectors. This is a clear sign of the lack of coordination between NCAs and NRAs in the selected jurisdictions.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The comparative study of the selected jurisdictions highlights certain tendencies in the application of competition rules for prosecution of excessive prices. While the EU Commission has been reluctant to enforce Article 102 TFEU against excessive pricing, the relatively young NCAs in new EU Member States and candidate countries have not hesitated to apply the domestic equivalents of this provision in order to prosecute dominant undertakings for taking advantage of their market position and charging their customers excessive or unfair prices. Although this paper did not aim to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the enforcement record against excessive pricing in the target jurisdictions, it has generated empirical data which shows the existence of a trend: contrary to the priorities of the EU Commission, the NCAs of new EU Member States and candidate countries are willing to prosecute excessive pricing. It remains to be seen whether this trend will be short lived as the NCAs accumulate knowledge, experience, and better coordination with the NRAs. As argued in Section B.1, the original focus of Article 102 TFEU was likely to be on exploitative abuses; the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries thus seem to have rediscovered the "original spirit" of Article 102 TFEU. The decision to sanction the excessive pricing under the domestic equivalents of Article 102 TFEU, therefore, is not an illegitimate choice per se. However, it can be observed that the NCAs in these countries have enforced the respective provisions of their competition laws in a rather inconsistent manner. Although the NCAs have shown willingness to sanction excessive pricing as an abuse of dominant position, they have received little external guidance on how to do so.
In 2009, the EU Commission adopted its Guidance Paper on "enforcement priorities" for applying Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary practices. 126 In view post intervention by the NCA in regulated sectors: (i) if the regulatory approach covering the goods or services related to the competition complaint appear effective, then ex post intervention is less likely to be helpful; (ii) if the complaint relate to goods or services which, if the competitive issue were resolved, enable effective competition, then ex post intervention is more likely to be helpful; and (iii) if the complaint relate to goods or services which are tightly intertwined with other regulated goods or services, then ex post intervention is less likely to be helpful.
of the limited number of decisions adopted by the EU Commission sanctioning excessive pricing, the fact that the Guidance Paper refers exclusively to exclusionary practices is not surprising. However, even though the EU Commission is reluctant to enforce Article 102 TFEU against excessive pricing, it should consider adopting similar guidelines covering exploitative conducts such as excessive pricing. In a decentralised competition law enforcement system, the guidelines adopted by the EU Commission on this subject should be welcome in order to ensure consistent competition law enforcement throughout the EU, as well as in the countries with accession prospects. The EU Commission's guidelines are aimed at providing legal certainty to private companies by offering an overview of the DG Competition's previous decisions and CJEU's case law in relation to a specifi c aspect of competition law enforcement. In spite of the limited case law in this sector, the EU Commission should adopt guidelines which would clarify when it would be appropriate for an NCA to sanction excessive pricing. In particular, the EU Commission should go beyond the restatement of the United Brands cost-price test; DG Competition should explain the diffi culties encountered in enforcing this test (ie lack of consideration of the demand fl uctuations). In addition, the EU Commission should provide an overview of the economic debate on this issue; in particular, it should explain the economists' main concerns concerning the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU against excessive pricing (ie that NCA intervention might be not necessary due to the self-adjustment of the market in the long term; the intervention might hamper dynamic effi ciencies). However, the EU Commission should also clarify the "test" to determine when the NCA should investigate excessive pricing under Article 102 TFEU (by referring, for instance, to the tests elaborated by Motta-De Streel and Evans-Padilla).
In the absence of a comprehensive public discussion on this subject, it would be premature to recommend further substantive rules that should fi nd their way into future guidelines. The important aspect to bear in mind is that the guidelines should not simply be reactive (ie refl ecting the existing EU Commission and CJEU case law on this issue) but, rather, proactive. In the decentralised system of competition law enforcement, the EU Commission should proactively ensure that the NCAs of the new EU Member States and candidate countries enforce EU competition rules in a consistent manner. The proactive role of the prospective guidance would require a broad debate among different stakeholders, as well as consideration of the diverging economic realities of the current and future EU Member States.
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